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STUDENT ESSAY




On December 6, 2004, at age twenty-one, Johnia
Hope Berry, was brutally slain in her Knoxville, Tennessee
apartment. She had come to the University of Tennessee
at Knoxville to pursue her master's degree after receiving a
bachelor's degree at East Tennessee State University. 3 The
night of her death, Johnia was sorting toys she bought for
children in need-a charitable habit she engaged in every
year.4 Johnia was deeply loved by two sets of parents:
Joan and Mike Berry (adoptive father), and Donna and
John Tiller (biological father).5
Joan and Mike Berry were very active in the search
for anyone responsible for Johnia's murder and in seeking
1 J.D., pending May 2010, University of Tennessee School of Law.
Prior to law school, Ms. Rambo worked for twenty years in the legal
field as a legal secretary and paralegal.
2 Hank Hayes, Johnia Berry Act Awaiting Governor's Signature (May
9, 2007), available at www.http://johniaberry.org; J.J. Stambaugh,
More details on suspect in Berry death; 'It was an accident' (Sept. 24,
2007), available at http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2007/sep/24/kcso-
spokeswoman-announces-break-berry-slaying/?printer=l1/; Liz Tedone,
Celebrating Johnia Berry's Legacy Three Years After Her Death (Dec.
6, 2007), available at http://www.volunteertv.com/home/headlines/
12236141 .html.
3 Hayes, supra, note 2.
4 Tedone, supra, note 2.
5 Hayes, supra, note 2; WVLT Channel 8, Trial Date Set for Johnia
Berry Murder Suspect (Sept. 25, 2007), available at
http://www.volunteertv.com/home/headlines/9979256.
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legislation to require DNA6 testing of arrestees for violent
crimes. 7 Joan Berry, in an effort to handle the brutality and
senselessness of Johnia's murder, even kept a journal of
questions she wanted to ask Johnia's killer.8 In the end, the
questions went unanswered as, after three long years, the
suspect committed suicide in his jail cell. Joan Berry
commented bitterly to the press that "'It makes me angry.
My daughter didn't get to leave a note. She didn't get to
say goodbye.'
9
6 A human's deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") contains a unique
alphanumeric identifier, much like a social security number, that is
being used to identify missing persons, crime victims, and suspected
crime perpetrators. While originally it was believed that the DNA
being tested contained only information necessary for identification,
scientists are now discovering that the so-called "junk DNA" may
contain information about genetic predispositions as well as ethnic and
gender identifiers. See, United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st
Cir. 2007); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 670 (2d Cir. 2005); State
v. Martin, Nos. 2006-119 & 2006-205, 2008 WL 1914658, at *10, *23
(Vt. May 2, 2008) (Johnson, J. dissenting); State v. Surge, 156 P.3d
208, 216 (Wash. 2007) (Chambers, J., dissenting) (noting "individual
DNA can provide much more than [a picture or a fingerprint] including
information about our ancestry, our medical future, and even
information about our biological family members."); Doles v. State,
994 P.2d 315, 318 (Wyo. 1999) (noting "DNA is the material that
determines the genetic characteristics of all living things ... [and]...
with the exception of identical twins, no two individuals have identical
DNA.").
7 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Representative Jason Mumford,
Tennessee House of Representatives, in Chattanooga (Jul. 3, 2008);
Hayes, supra, note 2; Amy Hunter, A second possible suspect surfaces
in Johnia Berry 2004 Slaying (Nov. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.tricities.com/tri/news/local/article/TRI 2007_11_17_0006/
3983/; TriCities.com, Johnia Berry's parents to meet with Prosecutors
(Nov. 18, 2007), available at http://www.tricities.com/tri/news/locaU
article/TRI_2007_11_18_0028/4022/.
8 Amy Hunter, Slain Student's Mother 'Very Upset' Over Suspect's
Suicide (Mar. 24, 2008), available at http://www.tricities.com/tri/news/
local/article/-TRI_2008_03_25_0005/7719/.
9 Hunter, supra, note 8.
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John and Donna Tiller were equally devastated.
Even though John allowed Mike Berry to adopt Johnia at
age 5, "it doesn't lessen his pain or emotion over what has
happened."' 0 John Tiller is thankful that he has a voice
mail message received from Johnia just six hours before
her murder, saying, "'Dad, I love you."" Out of this deep
sense of sadness and loss emerged a family's crusade to
ensure that no other family would suffer as they did for as
long as they did.1
2
Two and one-half years after the tragic stabbing
death of Johnia, twenty-two-year-old Taylor Lee Olson was
indicted for first-degree murder. 13 Other than petty crimes,
Olson had no significant criminal history through 2004 and
was never required by law to provide a DNA sample to
police. 14 In 2005, Olson was charged with credit card theft
and forgery, but this escalation was still not enough to
require a DNA sample under Tennessee law. 15 In early
2007, Olson became a person of interest in the criminal
investigation of Johnia's murder, but the police still had no
sample to compare against DNA found at the murder
scene. 16 It was not until late July, 2007, after Olsen had
been arrested for a probation violation, that the police
obtained a voluntary DNA sample from Olsen.
1 7
Afterward, Olsen was released, only to be arrested again in
late August 2007 for burglary and theft, not Johnia's
murder. 18
'0 WVLT Channel 8, supra, note 5.
11 Id.
12 Telephone Interview with Representative Jason Mumford, supra,
note 7.
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This paper will discuss the ever-widening scope of
federal and state DNA collection legislation that has largely
gone unnoticed by the general American populace. This
DNA legislation has continuously and systematically
eroded our Constitutional rights and has, to date, been
unanimously upheld by courts from the lowest state courts
to the United States Supreme Court. The checks and
balances of our democracy are failing in the never-ending
struggle against rising crime rates.
II. Legislative History of DNA Collection
It is important to review the legislative history of
DNA collection statutes in order to see how federal and
state legislatures have continuously, systematically, and
quickly been eroding our constitutional rights. While
federal legislation took the lead, state collection acts have
kept pace in both scope and time, despite concerns over the
cost of and personal information contained in DNA
sampling. Legislation has kept pace with the advances in
technology that continue to make it possible to obtain,
analyze, and store DNA more effectively. 19 DNA analysis
was first used in missing person investigations and
overturning wrongful convictions before finally being
recognized as a viable evidentiary tool in criminal
prosecutions.
20
In 1990, fourteen states participated in a pilot
program to capture DNA samples for a national indexing
system called the Combined DNA Index System
19 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); DNA-Sample Collection Proposed
Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 21083, 21085 (Apr. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. § 28.12).
20 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); DNA-Sample Collection Proposed
Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 21083, 21084 (Apr. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. § 28.12).
4
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("CODIS").21 In four short years, CODIS was expanded
across the nation.22  It took only six more years before
Congress systematically began expanding compulsory
23DNA testing. In less than twenty years, Congress
21 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 845 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Reinhardt, Pregerson, Kozinski, & Wardlaw, J.J., dissenting). CODIS
was initially created to store "DNA samples from individuals convicted
of crimes, from crime scenes, and from unidentified human remains,"
and later legislation allowed for "samples voluntarily contributed from
relatives of missing persons." Department of Justice Appropriations
Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-23 (1999). CODIS
makes it possible for "[s]tate and local forensics laboratories to
exchange and compare DNA profiles electronically in an attempt to
link evidence from crime scenes for which there are no suspects to
DNA samples of convicted offenders on file in the system."' United
States v. Sczubelek, 402 E3d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing H.R. Rep.
106-900(I), at 8 (2000)).
22 Kincade, 379 .3d at 845 (Reinhardt, Pregerson, Kozinski &
Wardlaw, J.J., dissenting) (noting passage of the Violent Crime Control
act of 1994); see also United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 76 (2d
Cir. 2007); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F3d 175, 181 (3d Cir.
2005) (citing Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223)).
23 DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub.L. No. 106-
546, 114 Stat. 2729, 2729, 2732 (2000) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 14135a (2000)) (including "individuals convicted of a
qualifying Federal offense," District of Columbia criminal offenders for
specified offenses, and military personnel convicted of specified
military offenses); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub.L. No. 107-56 § 503, 115 Stat. 364 (2001)
(including "terrorists and other violent offenders" convicted of
violating 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B), any violent crime defined in 18
U.S.C. § 16, or attempting or conspiring to commit such offenses);
Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203, 118 Stat. 2269
(2004) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 14132, 14135, 14135(a)) (including
"persons who have been charged in an indictment or information with a
crime," which covers all felonies, all 18 U.S.C. § 109A offenses, all
crimes of violence defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16, as well as any attempt or
conspiracy to commit these felonies and crimes); DNA Fingerprint Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 3084, 3085 (2006) (buried in
the voluminous Violence Against Women and Department of Justice
5
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expanded a narrowly defined authority to obtain DNA
samples from specific federally convicted felons to any
"individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted
or [ ] non-United States persons who are detained under the
authority of the United States.",24  Despite the fact that
legislative expansions are coming so quickly and the
Attorney General cannot implement final rules fast enough,
the United States Senate proposed a further expansion in
25June 2008. If implemented, this latest expansion of
federal law will require compulsory DNA samples from
any individual convicted of any felony under state law,
thereby preempting all or part of most state DNA collection
statutes.
6
Following in Uncle Sam's footsteps, the various
states began to enact DNA collection statutes. In fact, "all
50 States authorize the collection and analysis of DNA
samples from convicted state offenders . . . and several
states authorize the collection of DNA samples from
individuals they arrest.,27 However, the states' authorized
use of the profiles varies widely from identification to
detection or exclusion of potential suspects to the
Reauthorization Act of 2005, and including any United States citizen
arrested or non-citizen detained under authority of the federal
government); Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 155, 120 Stat. 611 (amending 42 U.S.C. §
14135(a)) (including persons facing charges, which presumably does
not require arrest or detention). See also Amerson, 483 F.3d at 75, 77;
United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007).
24 73 Fed. Reg. 21083, 21087 (Apr. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. § 28.12) (emphasis added).
25 73 Fed. Reg. 21083, 21083-84 (Apr. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. § 28.12).
26 DNA Felony Collection Act of 2008, S. 3104, 110th Cong. (2008).
27 See, e.g., Polston v. State, 201 S.W.3d 406, 412 n.3 (Ark. 2005)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added); State v. Maass, 64 P.3d 382, 386
(Kan. 2003); State v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 23 (Md. 2004); Landry v.
Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085, 1087, 1090 n.8 (Mass. 1999);
State v. O'Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 271 (N.J. 2007).
6
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prosecution of violent crimes.28 While the states also vary
widely as to the individuals subject to compulsory DNA
sampling, most states generally include individuals
convicted of violent felonies.29 Tennessee joined the DNA
collection bandwagon in 199130 and recently expanded its
reach to arrestees of specific violent felonies in 2007.31
Similarly, in 2008 a substantial increase of arrestee DNA
collection legislation was proposed in various states.
32
It took ten years after the first DNA legislation for
the federal government to require states to remove from the
database any DNA samples for persons with overturned
convictions. 33  It took four more years before Congress
prohibited arrestee or voluntary DNA profiles from being
included in CODIS and created a right to voluntary DNA
testing for convicted individuals who assert their
innocence. 34 In essence, in the same time it took to erode
28 Landry, 709 N.E.2d at 1090 n.8.
29 CAL. CODE REGS. Title 9, § 296 (2008) (including any felony
arrestees effective 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609 (2005)
(including any felony arrestees); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321(e)(3)
(Suppl. 2007) (including specific violent felony arrestees); TEX. PUBLIC
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 411.1471 (Vernon 2005) (an arrestee previously
convicted for specific statutory crimes); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2
(2004) (including any felony arrestees). See also Landry, 709 N.E.2d
at 1090 n.8 (including all persons arrested).
30 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321 (2006).
31 TENN. CODEANN. § 40-35-321(e)(3) (Suppl. 2007).
32 Gordon Thomas Honeywell, 2008 DNA Database Expansion
Litigation (May 14, 2008), available at http://www.dnaresource.com/
documents/2008DNAExpansionLegislation.pdf.
33 DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
546, 114 Stat. 2733 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a
(2000)).
34 Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203, 118 Stat.
2269 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 14132, 14135, 14135(a)) (noting that if
arrestee was charged with a separate crime requiring inclusion in the
database, then DNA sample from arresting offense could be placed into
database); 118 Stat. 2278-84 (2004) (adding Chapter 228A-Post-
Conviction DNA Testing, 18 U.S.C. § 3600-3600(a)) (noting that
7
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constitutional rights by requiring compulsory DNA testing,
Congress has provided compulsory removal only for
overturned convictions. Meanwhile, the United States
Congress is compelling local and state authorities to uvload
DNA profiles to CODIS as a prerequisite to its access.
I1. Historical Challenges to DNA Collection
As could be expected, with the increasing reach of
compulsory DNA testing, there was a corresponding
increase in legal challenges to its constitutionality.
Alternative theories for attacking DNA collection
legislation include equal protection claims, illegal search
and seizure, self-incrimination, and cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, as well as ex
post facto violations and even a violation of the right to the
free exercise of religion.36 Federal and state courts have
responded by applying a totality-of-the-circumstances
approach, a special-needs approach, or both to justify the
convicted individuals seeking post-conviction DNA testing must assert
innocence, must have preserved right to testing, and must meet specific
statutory requirements.).
3' 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3) (2008).
36 Quarterman v. State, 651 S.E.2d 32, 34, 35 (Ga. 2007); Schreiber v.
State, 666 N.W.2d 127, 128 (Iowa 2003); Raines, 857 A.2d at 21. In
addressing the self-incrimination and the cruel-and-unusual claims,
Georgia upheld the DNA collection statute and specifically noted that it
was not "penal and that means used to enforce the statute [were] not...
malicious or grossly disproportionate to the refusal to comply with the
statutory mandate." Quarterman, 651 S.E.2d at 35-36. With respect to
the ex post facto claim, Iowa rejected the idea that the intent of DNA
collection legislation "is to punish for past activity and not merely to
impose a restriction on someone 'as a relevant incident to a regulation
of a present situation."' Schreiber, 666 N.W.2d at 129, 130 (quoting
State v. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d 396, 398 (Iowa 1997)); see also People v.
Espana, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 258, 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Rise v.
Oregon, 59 E3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995) (overruled on other grounds));
Raines, 857 A.2d at 43.
8
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so-called constitutionality of DNA collection statutes.
37
The prevailing standard for judicial scrutiny appears to be
the rational basis standard.38
When applying a totality-of-the-circumstances
approach, a court is supposed to weigh the privacy interest
" Cf Weikert, 504 F.3d at 3, 8, 9 (citing Samson v. California, 547
U.S. 843 (2006)) (supporting use of special needs analysis but noting
that the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits
use the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis); United States v. Conley,
453 F3d 674, 679-81 (6th Cir. 2006) (supporting analysis under both
standards); Maass, 64 P.3d at 387 (two approaches: (1) balancing test
and (2) "special needs" doctrine); Landry, 709 N.E.2d at 1092;
O'Hagen, 914 A.2d at 273 (United States Supreme Court applies the
totality of circumstances test, not the "special needs" test); State v.
Martin, Nos. 2006-119 & 2006-205, 2008 WL 1914658, at *4 (Vt. May
2, 2008) (providing citations to many cases for both the balancing test
and the "special needs" test); State v. Surge, 156 P.3d 208 (Wash. 2007)
(noting concern that "special needs analysis is no longer valid under
federal law" is without merit).
38 State v. Leppert, 656 N.W.2d 718, 723 (N.D. 2003) (citing Roe v.
Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1999)); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d
1336, 1341 (10th Cir. 1996); L.S. v. State, 805 So. 2d 1004, 1007-08
(Fla. Ct. App. 2002); Quarterman, 651 S.E.2d at 34 n. 4, 35 (applying
rational relationship test as "neither a suspect class nor a fundamental
right [ ] affected by the challenged statute," and presuming legislation
valid with burden on individual to prove others similarly situated were
treated differently without a rational basis); Murphy v. Dept. of
Correction, 711 N.E.2d 149, 152-54 (Mass. 1999) (holding "some
amount of underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness is permissible" in
classifications and "[i]n the absence of evidence that the Legislature
harbored an illegitimate motive or had no rational reason to draw the
distinction as it did, the court must defer to the Legislature's
classification"); Gaines v. Nevada, 998 P.2d 166, 173-74 (2000); State
v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1087 (Wash. 1993); Schreiber, 666 N.W.2d at
128 (citing Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1999)). There are
"three levels ofjudicial scrutiny for reviewing equal protection claims":
strict scrutiny for "inherently suspect classification or infringement of a
fundamental right," intermediate standard when an "'important
substantial right' is involved," and rational basis for all other equal
protection claims. Leppert, 656 N.W.2d at 722; Olivas, 856 P.2d at
1087.
9
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of the individual against the government's purpose for
conducting the search. 39  The Supreme Court analogized
the individual's privacy interest with that of a physical
intrusion to justify giving the individual's privacy interest
less weight on the constitutional scale than the government
interest.40 This in no way addresses the fact that legally
recognized privacy rights of individuals include more than
the physical. To add further weight to the government's
side on the constitutional scale, some federal circuits apply
the "special needs" analysis to justify warrantless
searches.41 The special need is allegedly subject to the
31 Weikert, 504 E3d at 11. Following the federal majority, Arkansas,
Kansas, Massachusetts and Maryland, also applied a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach when faced with a challenge to their DNA
collection legislation concerning qualified convicted felons. Polston,
201 S.W.3d at 408, 410; see also Maass, 64 P.3d at 387; Raines, 857
A.2d at 31, 43; Landry, 709 N.E.2d at 1092. Governmental interests
included reducing recidivism; promoting reintegration; identifying,
monitoring, and maintaining records of likelihood of recidivism;
enhancing efficient and accurate crime solving; exonerating innocent
individuals wrongfully convicted; and protecting innocent individuals
from becoming suspects in the first place. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13-14.
Arkansas and Kansas hold that a convicted individual's "privacy rights
[were] diminished by virtue of [his] conviction and the intrusion of the
blood test [was] not significant . . ." and thus, "the collection and
maintenance of DNA samples pursuant to the DNA Act is reasonable in
light of the substantial interests of the State . . ." which includes
"deterring and detecting all recidivist acts, not just those considered to
be violent ... [and] . . . may indeed be useful in helping to solve future
drug crimes." Polston, 201 S.W.3d at 411,412; Maass, 64 P.3d at 389.
40 Weikert, 504 F.3d at 12.
4 Amerson, 483 F.3d at 81-83 (noting "special needs" are beyond the
need for normal law enforcement and make the warrant and probable-
cause requirement impracticable or are needed to achieve important
purposes not achievable by standard law enforcement methods"). See
also A.A. ex rel. B.A. v. Attorney General, 914 A.2d 260, 264 (N.J.
2007); O'Hagen, 914 A.2d at 273-75; State v. Martin, Nos. 2006-119 &
2006-205, 2008 WL 1914658, at *4 (Vt. May 2, 2008) (providing
citations to many cases for both the balancing test and the "special
needs" test).
10
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same balancing test of the relevant interests of the
individual and the government.42
In reality, courts have been failing to exercise the
checks-and-balances power afforded each branch of
government and justifying the erosion of constitutional
rights. Finding that DNA legislation, containing no
discretionary component, removes any risk of "dignitary
harms" or possibility of abuse, courts are justifying their
failure to "provide a check on the arbitrary use of
government power."43 As courts analogize privacy rights
with only physical privacy, they also seem to infer that
abuse of situational discretion is the only reason to apply
the governmental system of checks and balances instituted
by the founders of our country.44 However, it has been
recognized that advances in DNA sampling technology,
which provide genetic information beyond identification,
may require a reconsideration of the reasonableness of
DNA legislation. 45
42 The court must balance the special need against an individual's
privacy interest by examining three factors: "'(1) the nature of the
privacy interest involved; (2) the character and degree of the
governmental intrusion; and (3) the nature and immediacy of the
government's needs, and the efficacy of its policy in addressing those
needs."' Amerson, 483 F.3d at 83-84 (quoting Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471
F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 2006)). Several states agree that, "[a]lthough the
enumerated purposes may involve law enforcement to some degree, the
central purposes of the DNA testing are not intended to subject the
donor to criminal charges"; a need beyond "ordinary law enforcement"
must exist to justify DNA sampling without individualized suspicion;
the "long-range special need [ ] does not have the immediate objective
of gathering evidence against the offender.... [and] was not to assist in
the immediate detection of a crime charged . . . ." A. ex rel. B.A., 914
A.2d at 264; O'Hagen, 914 A.2d at 277, 278, 279; accord Martin, 2008
WL 1914658, at *6-7.
43 Weikert, 504 F.3d at 14-15 (citations omitted); Amerson, 483 E3d at
82.
44 Amerson, 483 F3d at 82.
45 Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13.
11
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IV. Reconsideration of Constitutionality of DNA
Collection Legislation
Reconsideration begins by determining the
characteristics of individuals subject to DNA collection
laws: (1) prisoners, (2) conditional releasees, (3) felons
with expired terms, and (4) individuals never convicted of a
felony.46 Acknowledging that convicted persons who have
paid their debt to society may have a "substantial privacy
issue at stake," some federal courts allow that a separate
balancing of retention against individual privacy rights may
be needed.47  Enlarging that theme, "it may be time to
reexamine the proposition that an individual no longer has
any expectation of privacy in information seized by the
government so long as the government has obtained that
information lawfully," especially "[w]here a right as central
to our liberty as the freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures is at stake., 48 While courts have unanimously
held DNA collection acts constitutional with respect to
convicted felons, the courts continue to vehemently debate
the constitutionality of legislation targeting individuals who
are merely arrested.49
The outcry against DNA collection may stem from
the inherent belief that individuals are "presumed innocent
until proved guilty,"50 as alluded to in various cases holding
46 Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679-80 (7th Cir. 2004).
41 Weikert, 504 F.3d at 12 (citing Kincade, 379 F.3d at 841-42 (holding
that "once a conditional releasee has completed his term," the privacy
interests differ from those he had while under supervision)).
48 Weikert, 504 F.3d at 16, 18 (Stahl, J., dissenting).
49 South Carolina's Governor Mark Sanford vetoed arrestee legislation
proposed by its legislature not only in 2007, but again on July 2, 2008.
Letter from Mark Sanford, Governor of South Carolina, to Robert W.
Harrell, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives of South Carolina
(Jun. 18, 2007); available at http://governor.sc.gov/NR/rdonlyres/
8DECDAD3-C95E-4871-8C02-52FBA8F8F69D/0/H3304.pdf.
50 In re C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 492 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
12
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that there is a significant difference in expectation of
privacy rights between convicted felons, probationers,
parolees, pretrial detainees, prisoners, and "ordinary
citizens" or arrestees. 5 1  To allow arrestee DNA testing
"would snuff out probable cause-the oxygen for the
Fourth Amendment," resulting in arrestees being searched
"without requiring law enforcement to show any nexus
between the arrestee and the crime for which his or her
DNA is sought." 52 Despite judicial warnings that obtaining
DNA from "free persons," which includes arrestees, should
be constrained by the Fourth Amendment, 53 the federal
legislature passed the Justice for All Act of 2004, allowing
for DNA testing of arrestees.54
Unfortunately, the majority of rightfully outraged
protest is found in dissenting opinions, which express
concern that "[t]he privacy and dignity of our citizens is
being whittled away by sometimes imperceptible steps."
55
This whittling is occurring in spite of "our nation's history
provid[ing] stringent warnings against unabashedly
entrusting [the] government with sensitive information
51 Raines, 857 A.2d at 31; see also Polston , 201 S.W.3d at 410;
Quarterman, 651 S.E.2d at 34; State v. McKinney, 730 N.W.2d 74, 84
(Neb. 2007) (noting critical distinction from Nebraska's other
jurisdictions' DNA collection statutes in that statute at issue "does not
limit the offenders to whom it applies"); Martin, 2008 WL 1914658, at
*8; Surge, 156 P.3d at 212-13. Minnesota's Court of Appeals found
"no basis for concluding that before being convicted, a charged
person's privacy expectation is different from the privacy expectation
of a person who was charged but the charge was dismissed or the
person was found not guilty"; therefore, an arrestee's expectation of
privacy was "not outweighed by the state's interest in collecting and
analyzing a DNA sample." In re C.TL., 722 N.W.2d at 489 n.2, 492.
52 McKinney, 730 N.W.2d at 84.
53 Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315, 318 (Wyo. 1999).
54 Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203, 118 Stat.
2269 (2004).
15 Martin, 2008 WL 1914658, at *13 (Johnson, J. dissenting) (quoting
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 343 (1966)).
13
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about our citizenry." 56 This whittling continues despite the
fact that historically inadequate protection of sensitive
information is less than reassuring, and there is doubt that
the government is immune to the temptation to use DNA
sampling for purposes beyond identification. 58
V. The Johnia Berry Act of 2007
A. Tennessee's Speedy Legislative Process
Like the few states before it, Tennessee amended its
DNA collection legislation to include DNA samples from
arrestees for violent felonies. 59  Johnia's family told the
Tennessee legislators of the suffering they endured upon
her death and the frustration resulting from almost three
years with no justice.60 Both the Senate and the House of
Representatives supported the passage of the Johnia Berry
Act of 2007 after hearing the tragic tale of young Johnia
Berry's slashed hopes and dreams. 61 Shockingly, from
proposal to approval, the Tennessee legislative process took
less than six months to enact the Johnia Berry Act of 2007.
Furthermore, Tennessee took only one year more than the
federal government to go from authorizing DNA collection
56 Martin, 2008 WL 1914658, at *24 (Johnson, J. dissenting).
57 Id.
58 Surge, 156 P.3d at 216 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
59 TENN. CODE ANN. §40-35-321 (Supp. 2007).
60 Mumford, supra, note 7.
61 Id. Minority Leader Jason Mumford proposed House Bill 0867
while Senate Speaker Ron Ramsey proposed Senate Bill 1196. S.
1196, 105th Leg. 1st Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 0867, 105th Leg. 1st
Sess. (Tenn. 2007). The Johnia Berry Act of 2007 was unanimously
adopted by the Tennessee Senate on April 23, 2007, unanimously
adopted by the Tennessee House of Representatives on May 9, 2007,
signed into law by Governor Phil Bredesen on May 24, 2007, and
amended title 40, chapter 35, section 321 of the Tennessee Code first
enacted in 1991. 2007 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 225; Senate Journal, 105th
Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess., at 988-91, 1369 (Tenn. 2007).
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for specific convicted felons to authorizing it for all
convicted felons and specific violent crime arrestees. 62
B. Tennessee's DNA Collection Process
The Johnia Berry Act of 2007 specifically requires
that all persons arrested for certain violent crimes have a
DNA sample taken via buccal (cheek) swab. 6 ' All DNA
samples are forwarded to the Tennessee Bureau of
Investigation ("TB") until a resolution of a criminal trial.64
If the individual charged with the felony is convicted of the
indicted crime, or is convicted of a different felony before
the sample is expunged, the DNA sample will remain with
the TBI to be used for comparison to DNA received from
new crime scenes.65 Should the individual be found not
guilty or exonerated, or if the charges are dropped, the
court of record is supposed to notify the TBI, who is
supposed to destroy and expunge the DNA sample from the
system.
66
Over 400 DNA samples were processed, and over
1000 people were interviewed during the criminal
investigation of Johnia's murder. 67 TBI Director Mark
Gwyn stated, "It was the most expensive case in the TBI's
history, having cost several hundred thousand dollars."
68
Now, with the passage of the Johnia Berry Act of 2007, an
additional one million dollars (at a minimum) will be
needed to process the estimated 21,000 additional,
legislatively required DNA samples. 69 While funding was
62 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321(e)(3) (Supp. 2007), as amended by
2007 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 225.
63 TENN. CODEANN. § 40-35-321(e)(1) & (3) (Supp. 2007).
64 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321(e)(1) (Supp. 2007).
65 Id.
66 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321(e)(2) (Supp. 2007).
67 Stambaugh, supra, note 2.
68 Id.
69 The Associated Press, TBI Chief: No Funds to Implement New
15
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received in June 2008, allowing the hiring of five more
forensic scientists, July saw a backlog of over 5,000 DNA
test kits. 70 In fact, between January and July 2008, only
1,000 samples were processed, and only three cases were
solved out of DNA test results: a murder, a burglary, and a
sexual assault.
7 1
C. Unforeseen Negative Impact of the Johnia
Berry Act
Analogizing DNA profiles to medical records or
fingerprint retention, courts are holding that comparing
profiles in the DNA databases does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, as ownership of the profiles (as opposed to
the actual DNA sample) belongs to the testing laboratories,
not the individual providing the sample.72 This results in
the allegedly constitutional use of a profile given in one
matter to be used in another, even unrelated, matter. 73 So
Johnia Berry Act (Dec. 3, 2007), available at http://www.volunteertv.
com/home/headlines/1209101 l.html.
70 Catharyn Campbell, New DNA Law Already Proving Valuable: DNA
Samples Now Required From All Violent Crime Suspects (Jul. 2, 2008),
available at http://Wwwwsmv.rcon/newsl167735991detail.html#.
71 Id.
72 Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 439-40 (citing Bickley v. State, 489
S.E.2d 167, 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)); Wilson v. State, 752 A.2d 1250,
1272 (Md. Ct. App. 2000); People v. King, 232 A.D.2d 111, 663
N.Y.S.2d 60, 614-15 (1997)); State v. Notti, 71 P.3d 1233, 1238 (Mont.
2003).
73 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321(e)(1) (Supp. 2007); Smith, 744
N.E.2d at 438 (holding constitutional the use of a DNA sample from
one criminal matter in a separate, unrelated criminal matter); State v.
Notti, 71 P.3d 1233, 1237-38 (Mont. 2003) (holding "that a defendant's
privacy interest in blood samples or blood profiles is lost when the
defendant consents to a blood draw or where it has been obtained
[lawfully]") (citing People v. Baylor, 118 Ca.Rptr.2d 518, 521 (Ca. Ct.
App. 2002); Wilson v. State, 752 A.2d 1250, 1272 (Md. Ct. App. 2000);
Bickley v. State, 489 S.E.2d 167, 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); State v.
King, 232 A.D.2d 111, 117-18, 663 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1997); Washington
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long as the DNA profile and sample are in the database,
even if later events require removal from the database,
there appears to be no restriction on the use for
comparisons. Even though federal law may prohibit
uploading of DNA samples from arrestees to CODIS, there
is no similar requirement in Tennessee law prohibiting local
and Tennessee database uploading. Therefore, any arrestee
required to provide a DNA sample in Tennessee is subject
to continuous, systematic comparisons in the local and
Tennessee databases absent a legally required
expungement.
D. Arrestees' Expectations of Privacy the
Issue for Judicial Scrutiny
It remains to be seen whether Tennessee courts will
find the Johnia Berry Act of 2007 constitutional. Prior to
the Act's passage, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld
Tennessee's DNA collection statutes, applying a totality-of-
the-circumstances approach. 74  Constitutionality was
supported in part by the fact that Tennessee's DNA statute
was limited to identification purposes, which "serve[d] to
protect our citizenry from the potential abuses of unlimited
discretion by law enforcement agents and officers., 75 The
Tennessee Supreme Court also concluded that "the risk of
arbitrary or capricious searches [was] . . . eliminated"
because the statute "unambiguously specifie[d] who [was]
subject to the searches," and the primary purpose was to
identify individuals with lessened expectations of
privacy. 76  While Tennessee's new legislation
unambiguously specifies that arrestees of specific violent
v. State, 653 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla. 1994); Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d
437)).
74 State v. Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d 607, 611, 618 (Tenn. 2006).
75 Id. at 619.
76 Id. at 621.
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crimes are required to provide a DNA sample, the
Tennessee courts will need to address whether arrestees are
still considered free persons with the heightened
expectations of privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
If the courts find arrestees to have a lessened expectation of
privacy, Tennesseans should demand an explanation of how
a person not convicted of a crime is now a person who is
presumed guilty until proven innocent and what, if any,
checks and balances remain to protect individual freedom
from government intrusion.
VI. The Future of DNA Collection Legislation
In June 2008, the United States House of
Representatives fired the latest volley to further expand the
scope of CODIS to require all state officials to obtain DNA
samples "from all felons who are imprisoned in a prison of
such State or unit."77 The Senate also proposed expanding
CODIS's scope to include any individuals convicted of
felonies under state laws but did not explicitly contain the
"retroactive" language contained in House Bill 598 1.78 The
passage of either of these proposed bills would essentially
remove the need for state legislation requiring DNA
samples from any individual convicted of any felony under
state law, bringing such legislation under the purview of
federal law.79 The next step is not hard to predict-all state
officials will be required to obtain DNA samples from
arrestees under state law and upload them to CODIS,
despite the current federal statutory prohibition. Perhaps
Congress will simply bypass this step and go straight to
DNA sampling of any person facing charges (i.e., person of
interest) for state law violations.
77 United States House Bill 5981 (May 6, 2008).
78 United States Senate Bill 3104 (Jun. 10, 2008).
79 United States House Bill 5981 (May 6, 2008); United States Senate
Bill 3104 (Jun. 10, 2008).
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The forecast for state and national DNA database
use is grand. Within three to five years, it is anticipated
that all DNA searches will occur through the CODIS
database, 80 suggesting that perhaps local and state
databases will be obsolete. In five to ten years, the CODIS
database may allow for "real time and immediate search
capabilities," and DNA samples may be routinely run on a
weekly basis through both the state and national systems.
81
Expanding the scope of DNA databases to include samples
given as an employment requirement (i.e., police officers'
DNA samples for use in crime scene comparisons to
eliminate contamination prints) is also being
contemplated. 82  Further, if the goal of "familial DNA
searching" to obtain leads to suspects or family members of
suspects is realized, no American will be safe from
systematic and continuous DNA profile comparisons.
83
VII. Conclusion
Stephen Saloom, Policy Director at the Innocence
Project, applauds the use of DNA collection databases for
solving approximately 10% of all crimes, which is
primarily comprised of the "more serious felonies: sexual
assaults, violent assaults, murders, and the like."
84
However, Mr. Saloom also recognizes that filling DNA
databases with samples and profiles of anyone not at least
convicted of a felony results in "diminishing returns."
85
Tania Simoncelli, Science Director of the Technology
80 Symposium, A Perfect Match? DNA in Law Enforcement, Genetics
and Public Policy Center at Johns Hopkins University, at *5-6 (Oct. 1,





84 id. at *12.
85 Id. at *13.
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Liberty Program at the American Civil Liberties Union,
agrees, noting further that, with the rise in DNA analysis
errors resulting from overburdening lab technicians with
"insurmountable backlogs[,] . . . it would be absolutely
tragic if in our enthusiasm for DNA, we ended up creating
a whole new round of wrongful convictions, the very sorts
of miscarriages of justice that we're aiming to set right with
DNA."
86
"We have been on an incredible slippery slope as
the databanks have expanded to evermore categories of
convicted individuals and [are] learning that we're in for an
even bigger slippery slope down the line." 87 Will the ride
be worth it? Will the criminal investigation tool be worth
the "life-long genetic surveillance" 88 of innocent United
States citizens, given the potential for diminished returns
due to inadequate collection processes, administrative and
laboratory logjams, and lack of follow-up by law
enforcement or prosecutors? 89
It is obvious that there are many questions still
unanswered by our legislatures and many questions
unknowingly left unasked by the American people. In
Tennessee and across the United States, American citizens
need to become informed about DNA legislation, sampling,
storage, and searches. The increase in knowledge from a
belief in "junk DNA," with no biological significance to the
more informed understanding that "junk DNA" contains
significant medical and familial lineage implications,
90
86 Id. at *11.
87 Id. at *8-9.
88 Id. at *10.
89 Id. at *13-14 (quoting Dr. Frederick Bieber, Journal of Law, the
American Society of Law, Medicine, and Ethics (2006)). Dr. Bieber
"serves on the advisory boards of the Armed Forces DNA Identification
Laboratory of the U.S. Department of Defense, the Department of
Forensic Science of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the National
DNA Database of Canada... [and] is a database proponent." Id.
9 Id. at *6, 9.
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indicates that a vast change needs to be made in how DNA
sampling is approached and applied. There are many
implications, both positive and negative, that need to be
explored before legislators and the judiciary continue to
support the erosion of Americans' rights to privacy, bodily
integrity, life, and liberty for the ordinary purpose of
criminal investigation.
21
